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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The facts are 
properly marshalled. 
Notwithstanding Steelco's assertion that defendants have 
failed to "marshal the evidence," defendants did painstakingly 
endeavor to do just that by the very extensive statement of facts. 
The statement of facts was intended as a marshalling of the 
evidence, and effort was made to refer to all significant evidence 
bearing on material points of dispute. Admittedly, not every 
little disputed fact was addressed. The unusual length of the 
statement of facts is born of this effort to present a 
comprehensive and fair statement. We have here a massive set of 
facts. The district court did not make precise findings, and we 
deal here with broad findings of fraud and conspiracy. The factual 
statement in defendants1 brief is a proper effort at marshalling. 
The record is 
faithfully cited. 
Contrary to Steelco's assertion of defendants' "failure to 
cite the record," every effort was made to provide record citation 
to every material point in the statement of facts. The record 
citations are not always repeated in the argument portion of the 
brief, but the statement of facts provides a record reference on 
every material fact. Further, contentious accusations such as that 
the brief contains "inaccurate statements of what the record shows" 
(page 5) , "misleading and inaccurate recitation of facts" (page 
62), "distort[s] and misrepresent[s] the record" (page 63), 
"inaccurately stating the evidence" (page 74) , and "misleading this 
court" (page 53) amount to a personal attack on the integrity of 
defendants' counsel, have no place in an appellate brief, and are 
of no assistance in resolving litigated issues. An earnest effort 
was made to cite the record accurately. It is a matter of concern 
that plaintiffs' counsel views it otherwise, but it is submitted 
that the integrity of the citations will be confirmed by this reply 
brief and by the Court's review of the record references. 
The Court should disregard 
plaintiffs' statement of facts. 
Steelco's "Statement of Facts" is not a statement of facts but 
an argument. The instances of pejorative, exaggeration, and 
2 
argument1 in this "statement of facts" are so numerous that to list 
them all would unduly prolong this brief. 
If there were a process at this level of court proceeding to 
strike this so-called statement of facts, that should be done. A 
statement of facts should be couched in non-argumentative language 
and should not include pejorative or advocatory statements. If 
Steelco wants to make these statements part of the argument section 
of its brief, that is acceptable, but this should not be tolerated 
in a "statement of facts." The acerbic tone of Steelco^ 
"statement of facts" is itself persuasive as to where the truth 
lies. Those who shout and scream usually have little of substance 
to shout and scream about. 
1
 Examples of improper argument and exaggeration as part of a 
purported statement of facts are shown by a reading of pages 10 to 
15, which shows that almost every sentence is couched in 
argumentative language and uses argumentative words and phrases not 
found any place in the record: "process was suspicious" (page 10, 
line 13), "inexplicably paid Heaton" (page 10, line 17), "knew or 
should have known" (page 10, line 20), "any rational person" (page 
10, line 21 and page 11, line 4), and "no plausible reason" (page 
11, line 11). (Also see the first three paragraphs on page 12.) 
Further examples of exaggeration and argument are Steelcofs 
references to the quantity of steel Heaton took in the pickup 
trucks as "vast" or "huge" amounts, the ballast steel Wasatch sold 
to Steelco as "junk," the cuttings of steel Wasatch bought from 
Heaton as "remnant," the commissions Heaton requested as 
"kickbacks," the delivery process as "suspicious," the price paid 
for the steel as "bargain" and "fraudulently inflated," and 
Steelcofs generalization that Hurst and Heaton "always met behind 
closed doors, which never happened with anyone other than Hurst." 
These exaggerations are not supported by the record. Facts not 
properly cited to, or supported by, the record are not to be 
considered. Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142, 
144 (Utah 1978) . 
3 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS 
I 
The Claims Are Barred 
It remains that plaintiffs1 claims are barred by the statute 
of limitations and by the prior settlement agreement between 
plaintiffs and Heaton. Plaintiffs have presented nothing to avoid 
the impact of these threshold legal issues. 
A. Statutes of Limitation Bar 
Plaintiffs' Claims. 
In the face of the three-year statute of limitations, 
plaintiffs were permitted to present evidence on and collect 
damages for alleged wrongdoing clear back to 1983 even though this 
case was not filed until April of 1989. Thus, the threshold issue 
on this appeal is plaintiffs1 effort to avoid the limitation 
period. 
The limitation issue 
was properly raised. 
Steelco seems to argue that separate limitation arguments must 
be made with respect to each theory of its case. This is not 
necessary, because the limitation period (three years) is the same 
on each of the theories on which the court based its findings. 
But, even so, defendants1 amended answer included as a fourth 
affirmative defense: "The action of Plaintiff is barred by the 
provisions of UCA § 78-12-25 and § 78-12-26." Section 26(2) is the 
limitation on actions for conversion; section 26(3) is the 
limitation on actions for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud. 
Plaintiffs, in the findings prepared by them, made no 
distinction between the limitations applicable to their separate 
4 
claims. Throughout the case, arguments addressed to limitations 
issues went to all three theories of recovery because a three-year 
period applied to all. The court made no distinction. That these 
issues were presented to the trial court is shown by the court1s 
Findings 46-48, which deal generally with limitations to all of the 
claims. (R. 350-352.) The court does not distinguish among 
conversion, fraud and conspiracy claims in making findings. 
Similarly, defendants' objections were addressed to all of these 
claims, and no distinction is necessary. (R. 305-308.) 
The discovery rule does 
not save plaintiffs1 case. 
The gist of plaintiffs1 argument is that they are saved by the 
discovery rule. That rule cannot be applied here. The opening 
brief notes that (p. 38) Utah's statute does not extend the 
discovery rule to conversion actions; but beyond that, there is no 
basis for utilizing the rule on any of the claims in this case. 
As in so many other places, plaintiffs rely upon the findings 
without addressing the point that those findings are not supported 
by facts in the record. It is those very findings that are here 
challenged, and the simple act of the court's signing of 
plaintiffs' proposed findings does not create something out of 
nothing. Plaintiffs complain that facts have not been marshalled. 
But one cannot marshall facts that do not exist, and there are no 
facts here justifying application of the discovery rule. There is 
no evidence showing that defendants committed any act of 
concealment or establishing that defendants had any duty of 
disclosure. 
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Steelco concedes that the discovery rule would not apply 
unless there was evidence of "exceptional circumstances" or 
"fraudulent concealment." However, there are no facts which make 
this case exceptional. Plaintiffs' argument is nothing more than 
an assertion that every fraud and conspiracy claim is exceptional. 
They would have the Court say that the discovery rule is 
automatically applied in a fraud and conspiracy case and the 
limitation period cannot begin to run until a plaintiff gets around 
to doing something that finally alerts it to the claimed 
wrongdoing. This would read the statute of limitations out of the 
law pertaining to fraud and conspiracy. That is not the law, and 
it ought not to be the law where claims of fraudulent conduct are 
asserted. 
To toll the limitation period, there must be an "affirmative 
act . . . calculated to obscure the existence of a cause of 
action." Pavne v. Stratman, 229 Mont. 377, 380, 747 P.2d 210, 213 
(1988). Utah "cases dealing with fraudulent concealment indicate 
that neither material omissions nor fraudulent affirmative 
statements are actionable absent a duty to speak the truth." 
Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 
1989). Plaintiffs have not shown one single "affirmative act" by 
defendants or one single "fraudulent affirmative statement." 
Steelco overlooks an important distinction between the finding 
of fraud related to payment of some commissions (or "kickbacks" as 
plaintiffs characterize them) and the' finding of fraudulent 
concealment necessary to toll the statute of limitations. Where 
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there is no fiduciary relationship creating a duty of disclosure, 
a claim may be time-barred even if a defendant had knowledge but 
did not affirmatively disclose. Hurst had no fiduciary 
relationship that required him to disclose to Steelco that its 
superintendent, Heaton, asked for a commission on a small number of 
sales. 
Defendants did nothing to conceal a claim from Steelco. The 
allegation that Mr. Hurst refused to talk to Elkington, Steelco1s 
chief executive, is without support in the record.2 Mr. Hurst 
cooperated with Elkington1s request but, on the advice of counsel, 
asked for authorization from Heaton before producing records of 
transactions with him. (R. 454 at 91, 94.) As an experienced 
accountant, Elkington took notes from the records for the years 
1985, 1986 and 1987, but he never returned to review records from 
earlier years which were more difficult to locate. (R. 454 at 94-
98.) The fact that, after his visit late in the day on New Year's 
2
 Steelco also maintains that when Elkington called Hurst, 
Hurst "confirmed the phony $9,185.85 number" given to Steelco by 
Hurst as the value of the steel he had sold to Wasatch. 
(Plaintiffs1 brief at 22.) Elkington!s testimony does not go that 
far: 
Q. What did the two of you say? 
A. I [Elkington] told him [Hurst] I hadnft heard back 
from him yet but I had received a letter from Volma 
Heaton which indicated that the total loss related 
to his involvement with Wasatch Steel was $9,100, 
approximately. And asked him if that was accurate 
and he said he thought it was. 
(R. 452 at 131-132, emphasis added.) But that was only a 
preliminary telephone inquiry, not based on any examination of the 
records. 
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Eve (R. 454 at 94), Elkington never returned to review records for 
1983 and 1984 does not show concealment. 
Recognizing that there is no evidence of any act of 
concealment by defendants, Steelco tries to hold defendants 
responsible for Heatonfs acts of concealment. In the pages (46-47) 
where plaintiffs try to show that the court fs findings with respect 
to the discovery rule "are amply supported by the record/' Heaton's 
name appears 23 times (not counting the personal pronouns referring 
to him), Wasatch Steel is mentioned twice, and Mr. Hurst is 
mentioned twice (and this only in the context of being on the 
receiving end of Heaton's action, not in the context of doing any 
affirmative act of concealment). The brief recites that Heaton did 
this, and Heaton did that. It does not show anything that Mr. 
Hurst did or said. This effort to convert their superintendent's 
acts of concealment into acts of defendants is contrary to this 
Court's express direction that the "concealment of necessary facts 
or misleading" must be done by the party asserting the limitations 
defense. Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254# 1257 
(Utah 1983) (in the case of a counterclaim, required an act of 
concealment "by the plaintiff"—emphasis in original). 
B. Steelco Released its Claims 
by its Agreement with Heaton 
The issue was presented 
to the trial court. 
Steelco insists that the issue of whether its settlement 
agreement with Heaton bars this action was not adequately raised. 
Wasatch pleaded as a "Second Affirmative Defense": 
8 
On March 24, 1988, Heaton and Plaintiff entered into a 
written Agreement which settled all matters between them 
and particularly those matters allegedly involving the 
Defendant Wasatch Steel Inc. A copy of this Agreement is 
attache[d] hereto. The Agreement contains no reservation 
of rights and therefore constitutes a complete bar to 
Plaintiffs' action. 
(R. 88, emphasis added.) 
Rule 8 requires only a "short and plain" statement of the 
claim. "No technical forms of pleading" are required. Rule 8(e), 
Utah R. Civ. P. "The general rules of pleading that are applicable 
to the statement of a claim also govern the statement of 
affirmative defenses." 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure, § 1274 (1990 & Supp. 1991). Statutory citations 
need not be provided at the pleading stage, id., § 1377; see also, 
Jackson v. Jovner. 12 Utah 2d 410, 367 P.2d 452, 454 (1961) 
(contents of applicable Wyoming laws did not need to be pleaded). 
Steelco also claims this defense was never argued because it 
is not discussed in defendants1 memorandum. (R. 387.) However, 
counsel did try to present the argument. E.g., R. 451 at 42-62. 
When the court questioned the settlement agreements admissibility, 
counsel explained, "I think if [the plaintiffs] donft preserve 
their rights, that they can't pursue any further action against 
third parties." (R. 451 at 61.) 
After the court adopted the findings of fact proposed by 
Steelco, defendants objected to Findings 53-55 regarding the 
effects of the settlement agreement. (R. 310-311.) They 
emphasized that "the agreement does not reserve any right against 
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anyone" and that it was "was fully performed by both parties" 
before the attempted rescission. (Id.) 
The Joint Obligations Act 
still applies to this case. 
The issues in Krukiewicz, Holmstead, and this case are not 
identical. Steelco maintains that § 15-4-4 of the Joint 
Obligations Act has no application to these facts since its "pro 
tanto" repeal by § 78-27-42 of the Comparative Negligence Act. Of 
course, the phrase "pro tanto" as used in Krukiewicz does not mean 
"total" or "complete"—it means "as far as it goes." Black's Law 
Dictionary. 
In construing statutes, this Court has always been careful to 
harmonize two apparently conflicting statutes where possible. Any 
repeal by implication is disfavored and is narrowly construed. 
By its terms, the Joint Obligations Act applies to joint 
obligors, including joint tortfeasors. The Comparative Negligence 
Act and its successor, the Liability Reform Act, apply to 
negligence claims. Thus, it is not difficult to harmonize the two 
statutes: The Joint Obligations Act states a general rule; the 
Comparative Negligence Act states an exception which applies to 
negligence claims.3 
Steelco argues that release rules enunciated in the Joint 
Obligations Act have been "generally abandoned"—by the Restatement 
Second or in some other jurisdictions. That would not justify 
3
 Because tortfeasors in negligence actions that accrue after 
the effective date of the Liability Reform Act can be found only 
severally liable, the Joint Obligations Act no longer applies to 
them. The two laws again stand separately. 
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abandoning them in this jurisdiction, for the Utah legislature has 
never expressly repealed them, and any repeal by implication must 
be based on the principles of statutory construction enunciated by 
this Court. 
The holding in Krukiewicz is not disputed. However, 
Krukiewicz is distinguishable: (1) it was a negligence action, and 
(2) the settlement agreement expressly reserved a right to proceed 
against the defendant, the negligent tortfeasors employer. 
Steelco quotes a sentence in Krukiewicz out of context to 
support its argument that "the Comparative Negligence Act applies 
no matter what theory of liability is advanced by the plaintiff." 
The context surrounding that sentence shows a different intent. 
When plaintiffs sued the negligent tortfeasor's employer, the 
employer argued that the Comparative Negligence Act should not 
apply because his liability was only "derivative"; it arose "not as 
a result of any actual negligence by the employer, but solely 
because of the employerfs employment of the employee." The court 
rejected the employers argument, explaining: 
Section 78-27-40(3), patterned after the 1939 Uniform 
Act, defines a joint tort-feasor in terms of liability, 
not negligence: Joint tort-feasor means "one of two or 
more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort. ..." 
All jurisdictions which have statutes similar to the 1939 
version of the Uniform Act have determined that the 
master-servant relationship is within the Uniform Actfs 
definition of joint tort-feasor. 
At 1352. 
Significantly, Steelco does not address Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 270 (Utah 1982), where this Court 
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refused to apply the Comparative Negligence Act to a strict 
liability claim. 
If comparative negligence principles do apply, this case must 
be remanded for a determination of the relative fault of Heaton, 
Williams, plaintiffs, and defendants. 
The settlement agreement is 
not void for inaccuracies. 
Contrary to Steelco's argument that the release was given 
"shortly following Steelco's discovery" of Heaton1s conduct (page 
26) , the agreement was not made until March 1988, long after 
Steelco was advised of Heaton1s conduct in November 1987 and after 
Elkington had examined the records at Wasatch in December 1987. 
Steelco now raises a host of supposed inaccuracies in the 
information given and argues that the agreement was not effective 
because of the inaccuracies. But when we look to what Steelco's 
president testified was the basis for this attempted rescission, 
there is no basis for this contention. The facts, fully supported 
by record references, are given in the opening brief (pp. 33-35). 
Contrary to Steelco's assertion that no record citation is given 
for, and that the record does not support, the statement that 
Elkington was told that the 1983 and 1984 records would be made 
available at a more convenient time and with Heaton fs 
authorization, record reference is given in the statement of facts 
at page 24, and the record does fully support that statement. (R. 
454 at 97-98.) Steelco's effort to avoid knowledge that a 
"commission" was paid (as discussed at page 34 of the opening 
brief) and its claim that the record showing the commissions "had 
12 
no indication that it was a kickback11 strains credibility when it 
is realized that Elkington is a trained accountant with years of 
experience with a "big eight" accounting firm. Steelco's assertion 
that these were "kickbacks" rather than "commissions" is just 
semantics, not evidence that information was withheld.4 Moreover, 
even if every detail of Heaton's conduct were not known when the 
agreement was signed, that is not essential, particularly in light 
of Elkingtonfs testimony of the basis for the so-called rescission. 
Beyond that, the agreement itself recited: 
The Company has recently discovered some of such wrongful 
and unlawful acts, and now has sufficient knowledge and 
evidence to bring a lawsuit or other action against 
Heaton for, among other things, restitution of monies 
wrongfully received by Heaton. 
(Ex. P-22 at 1; emphasis added.) 
4
 On this important point, it is to be noted that Heaton first 
testified at trial that he advised Elkington about the commissions 
"before or at the time" he entered into the settlement agreement. 
(R. 451 at 123-124). At that point, fortuitously for plaintiffs, 
a recess was called. After the recess, Mr. Heaton1s memory is 
suddenly not clear: "I am not positive. Some time, I don't know 
when it was . . . . I don't recall exactly when . . . . I don't 
know when it was or the circumstances No, I don't think it 
was [when Elkington was talking to him in December 1987]. I am not 
sure when it was. . . . Whether it was after we had signed the 
agreement or whether it was between that Settlement Agreement and 
the time of the Rescission, that they mentioned the commissions. 
I don't recall when it was. I cannot give you a date on it. . . . 
I don't know when it was. I don't. That was three years ago." 
(R. 451 at 125-126.) This further underscores the importance of 
the statute of limitations in this case. This is another example 
(in addition to those given at pag6 43 of the opening brief) of 
plaintiffs' witnesses being unable to remember important facts 
because of the passage of time. 
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Mere designation as an 
"agreement not to sue" 
does not alter the effect. 
Steelco argues that its release did not effect release of 
other parties because it was termed an "agreement not to sue." The 
general rule is that "a covenant not to sue one or more tortfeasors 
with express reservation of the right to proceed against others 
does not bar an action against other joint tortfeasors." United 
States v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 208 F.2d 428 (D. Utah 1958) 
(emphasis added; applying Utah Code Ann. § 15-4-1 to 4). 
Steelcofs "agreement not to sue" did not expressly reserve the 
right to proceed against others. "[I]n the absence of such a 
reservation of rights," the release—however denominated—"shall 
discharge co-obligors" as provided in § 15-4-5. Utah Code Ann. § 
15-4-4 (Joint Obligations Act). 
The designation as a "release" or a "covenant not to sue" is 
immaterial. To determine the nature of the document it is 
necessary to look to its terms, the words used, the amount paid, 
the substance of the agreement, and the intention of the parties. 
"In a true covenant not to sue, the amount of damages is uncertain, 
the party does not intend to fix the loss by the agreement, and 
full satisfaction is not admitted." Dawson v. Board of Education, 
222 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah 1950). The release at issue here is not a 
true covenant not to sue, because rights against others were not 
expressly reserved, the amount of damages was calculated, and the 
parties did intend to fix the loss and provide full satisfaction. 
(See Ex. 22-P). 
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The purported "rescission" 
was untimely and not 
supported bv considerations 
Steelco^ elaborate effort to support its argument that the 
"rescission" of the release is supported by consideration is of no 
help, because the attempted rescission did not occur until four 
months after this suit was filed and defendants had raised the 
issue. The attempted rescission could not subsequently avoid the 
impact of that release. The claim had been released before suit 
was filed. When a valid release has been executed, any subsequent 
rescission should be accomplished prior to bringing suit. 
Steelco1s alleged rescission was untimely. The "rescission" was 
not signed until August 16, 1989—more than four months after the 
complaint was filed. (See chronology in Appendix B to the opening 
brief.) 
Further, the "rescission" was not really a rescission. The 
money paid by Heaton as part of the settlement was not returned. 
Any rescission that would return the parties to the status quo 
would have required a refund of the consideration. 
The rescission is also invalid because it was not supported by 
adequate consideration. The rescission itself must be supported by 
consideration. Steelco argues there was consideration because 
Heaton was relieved of various obligations. The "assignment" was 
illusory because there is no evidence that there were any amounts 
due to him. Further, the whole agreement is illusory because 
Steelco never intended to enforce any of these matters in any 
event. It had already given assurances to Heaton that it would 
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keep this whole matter out of court (Exhibit 20-P), and no action 
has ever been taken against Heaton. 
II 
The Evidence Is Not Adequate to 
Support the Courtfs Findings of Liability 
A. The Inadequacy of the Findings in General 
The factual picture 
must be seen clearly. 
The factual picture here involved covers several years and a 
long course of dealing between the parties. Mr. Heaton had been 
selling materials from Steelco's plant during this same time to at 
least three other companies in addition to Wasatch Steel. (Record 
references at p. 14 of opening brief.) To understand this picture, 
it is necessary to focus accurately on the picture and see it 
precisely as it applies to defendants and not in the blurred mess 
presented by plaintiffs. To do that, plaintiffs1 concession 
(plaintiffs1 brief at p. 6) that this case involves "two discrete 
kinds" of conduct is helpful. These two kinds of conduct were (a) 
purchase over a period of years (1983-1987) of steel sold by 
plaintiffs1 superintendent; and (b) payment of commissions with 
respect to the ballast steel sold by Wasatch when Steelco 
experienced a shortage of this type of rough material in 1986. It 
is correct that these were discrete factual circumstances, and they 
should be examined as such. It is further helpful if it is 
understood that the first discrete factual circumstance, the 
purchase of steel by Wasatch, involved two basically different 
situations: (a) purchase of "cuttings," be they "scrap" or 
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"remnant," and (b) purchase of some larger items from the South 
Yard when Steelco directed its superintendent in 1986 to clean up 
the South Yard and dispose of the steel that had long been sitting 
out there. Thus, there are really three discrete kinds of conduct. 
This distinction is necessary because of the different types of 
steel involved and the different circumstances in Heatonfs disposal 
of it. 
The evidence must be 
clear and convincing. 
In examining the adequacy of the factual record, it must be 
remembered that as to the findings of fraud and conspiracy it is 
not enough if there is some evidence; there must be clear and 
convincing evidence. Plaintiffs' approach in some places in their 
brief is to point to the finding on a particular factual conclusion 
as evidence that facts to support that conclusion exist. The 
finding is not evidence, but rather it must be supported by 
evidence, and the supporting evidence must be clear and convincing. 
The findings 
are inadequate. 
Many of the findings of fact which plaintiffs caused the court 
to sign are not really findings of "fact"; they are, rather, 
conclusions of fact or legal conclusions. For example, Finding 14, 
which is the main finding on the fraud and conspiracy issue, 
concludes that "Volma Heaton, on the one hand, and Lynn Hurst and 
Wasatch Steel, on the other hand, combined, conspired, and agreed 
that Volma Heaton would over time steal materials from Steelco and 
deliver them to Wasatch Steel, Inc. and that Wasatch Steel, Inc. 
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would pay to Heaton a fraction of the value of that steel. . . .M 
Yet nowhere is there any direct finding as to any act, occurrence, 
or fact that would establish this legal conclusion. For example, 
there is no finding that Hurst said this or Hurst did that. 
Similarly, Finding 13 makes a legal conclusion that defendants 
"should have known, and did know, that Heaton was stealing the 
steel material from Steelco . . . ." That also is a conclusion and 
not a finding of fact. It does not find that an event or series of 
events occurred from which this conclusion is reached. Thus, this 
Court cannot readily assess the propriety of these conclusions. If 
the court below had determined a fact, for example, that on certain 
occasions this was said or that was done or something else 
occurred, defendants would be able to marshal evidence that bore on 
that specific finding and this Court would be able to determine if 
there were clear and convincing evidence to support the finding 
that that event occurred. But here it cannot do so. 
B. There Is No Clear and Convincing 
Evidence of Fraud 
Plaintiffs attempt to treat this appeal as an attack on only 
four findings. While it is true that the four findings referred to 
are without proper evidentiary support, the manifest problem is 
that there is no clear and convincing evidence of the alleged fraud 
and conspiracy. 
Defendants did not 
know of Heaton's thefts. 
It remains, as discussed in the opening brief, that a key 
element to plaintiffs1 case is the assertion that defendants knew 
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of Heatonfs fraud on his employer. Here, Finding 13 offers us no 
fact whatever. It simply concludes that Hurst and Wasatch Steel 
should have known or did know. Even after all of the rhetoric in 
plaintiffs' brief, it remains that it is not so established by 
clear and convincing evidence. All that plaintiffs have presented 
are murky and muddled contentions, not clear and convincing 
evidence. Plaintiffs do not once cite the record in this portion 
of their brief but simply say "the Statement of Facts sets forth 
the evidence that defendants had knowledge of the fraud." That may 
be acceptable if there were adequate record references in the 
statement of facts, but there are not. Let us look again at the 
"evidence" that plaintiffs refer to. 
First, plaintiffs state (p. 57) that this included evidence 
that Heaton repeatedly reminded Hurst that his deliveries of stolen 
steel were to be kept secret. There is nothing but a general 
statement by Heaton. Candidly, it is conceded that that is some 
evidence, but in light of the entire record it is not clear and 
convincing evidence. Heaton1s statement that he told defendants 
not to say anything about these purchases came out only at trial. 
It was denied by Mr. Hurst. (R. 454 at 98.) 
Even these alleged statements not to say anything were not 
made in the course of the sale of the remnant or scrap cuttings but 
are supposed to have been made in the course of the sale of 
material from the South Yard in 1986 when Heaton was telling Mr. 
Hurst which loads were to be paid for to Steelco and which were to 
be paid to him. (R. 451 at 8, 14, 16-19.) Thus, even these 
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claimed statements would not have been made with respect to the 
sale of cuttings. While it is admittedly not clear in which of 
these discrete situations those statements are supposed to have 
been made, that is the point—the very testimony is not clear and 
convincing. 
But beyond this, this testimony is contradicted by other 
statements of Heaton made in his pretrial deposition and is 
inconsistent with other facts in the case. First, it must be noted 
that plaintiffs try to slide over Heaton's trial testimony (R. 451 
at 75) and his prior deposition testimony that in the beginning he 
told Wasatch that he was buying this material from Steelco (quoted 
in defendants1 opening brief at p. 49) by simply asserting that the 
companion statement in the opening brief that Heaton again affirmed 
that the subject was never brought up again "is inaccurate" (p. 57 
plaintiffs1 brief). Heaton's testimony (R. 451 at 78-81) is set 
forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief. The record shows that 
the statement in defendants1 opening brief is entirely accurate. 
Heaton himself said, "When I first started dealing with him, I told 
him I was buying it and reselling it," and Heaton repeated more 
than once that the subject was never brought up again. Mr. Hurst 
confirmed this. (R. 454 at 72.) This is but one example of the 
errors in plaintiffs1 brief. 
In addition to this prior contradictory deposition testimony, 
plaintiffs have no answer to Heatonfs testimony quoted in the 
opening brief (p. 50) that he had "no agreement with Lynn Hurst or 
Wasatch Steel to misappropriate material from [his] employer." 
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Plaintiffs have no answer for Heaton's testimony that he at first 
paid his employer and that when he changed and stopped paying for 
the steel he never told anyone about it. (R. 451 at 96-99.) 
Plaintiffs have no answer for the fact that, when Heaton started 
the process of buying and selling, his purchases were authorized. 
(See record references at p. 10 of opening brief.) 
It is also illuminating to review the other evidence which 
plaintiffs rely on in an effort to conceal the absence of clear and 
convincing evidence that defendants knew that the material being 
sold was stolen. Plaintiffs assert that "Hurst misled Steelco 
employees to believe that Hurst was a personal friend" (p. 58, no 
record reference given). The record reference for this in 
plaintiffs1 statement of facts is R. 452 at 26, where Patty Midgley 
simply said that Mr. Hurst came into her office sometimes every 
week and would ask for Volma Heaton. "He would just say that he 
was Lynn Hurst and so I figured it was a personal friend." Is this 
clear and convincing evidence that defendants "misled" anybody? Is 
this clear and convincing evidence that defendants knew that the 
material was stolen? Plaintiffs also offer as support for this 
finding that defendants "knew" the goods were stolen, that "Hurst 
never dealt with anyone at Steelco other than Heaton." (P. 58, no 
record reference.) In the first place, Mr. Hurst did not know 
anyone else at Steelco to deal with (R. 454 at 87), but it may be 
asked, simply, what need was there to deal with anyone else when 
Steelco fs superintendent was the one who had come to Wasatch and 
offered the material for sale? As further "evidence," plaintiffs 
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tout that "virtually all deliveries were after Steelco's hours." 
(P. 58, no record reference.) This is not clear and convincing 
evidence that defendants knew the steel was stolen, but it is also 
not the fact. The record is to the contrary. Even under 
plaintiffs1 version of the facts, deliveries were made before 
Wasatchfs closing time at 5:00 p.m., and while Steelco's second 
shift was in full progress. (Record references at p. 14 of opening 
brief.) These are hardly clandestine activities, and this is not 
clear and convincing evidence of a fraudulent conspiracy or of 
knowledge on the part of defendants. 
The assertion is made (p. 59) that when Steelco discovered 
Heatonfs thefts and requested the opportunity to look at the 
records of Heaton1s sales to Wasatch, defendants did not react like 
honest businessmen because Mr. Hurst said he first wished to 
contact the company's lawyer. The reason for that is quite simple. 
Heaton had been in earlier and for the first time advised that he 
was "being investigated." (R. 454 at 88-89.) It was Heaton under 
investigation, not Wasatch, but Wasatch did not wish to get caught 
in the middle of that dispute. Heaton asked that information not 
be given, but he was told Hurst would not be involved in any 
attempt to withhold information. (R. 454 at 89.) The advice given 
by the lawyer was simply to obtain Heatonfs permission for 
inspection of records pertaining to the sales by him. It is hoped 
that all clients do not become suspect because they seek guidance 
from their lawyer. But beyond this, it must be remembered that 
throughout this entire course Wasatch had kept a precise record and 
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receipts of every payment to Heaton. (R. 450 at 42-49, 199.) Does 
one keep precise records and receipts if one is trying to commit 
fraud in the very transactions recorded? Those records were 
readily made available to Elkington, the only condition being that 
Heaton, who was the one under investigation, give authorization. 
The authorization was given and the records were immediately made 
available. No records whatsoever were withheld, and the statement 
that the "only records Elkington saw were those hand picked by 
Hurst" is absolutely not true. Plaintiffs give no record reference 
for these extreme statements (p. 59). The record references for 
the facts on these points are given at pages 21 through 24 of 
defendants1 opening brief. 
In this same context, plaintiffs argue that Mr. Hurst "picked 
out the remnants he wanted from Steelco's remnant racks." (P. 58, 
no record reference.) Although there is no record reference in 
this argument, there are record references for similar statements 
in plaintiffs1 statement of "facts" (p. 10). The argument (p. 58) 
makes it sound like Mr. Hurst went over and "picked out" all the 
cuttings to be purchased. The statement of "facts" concedes that 
Mr. Hurst did this only "sometimes" (p. 10) . There are several 
important points to understand here. First, plaintiffs rely 
totally on Mr. Hurst's testimony for this assertion of fact, and 
plaintiffs must accept that testimony on this issue in its totality 
and not take just bits and pieces. Mr. Hurst explained to counsel 
when questioned on this line: 
What I am trying to imply here is that in '87 there were 
times when a big major yard cleanup began and I went over 
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and gave a bid on a large quantity of material. Nothing 
specific, no sorting, no picking, just here is the area 
that needs to be cleaned, you know, and I made a bid at 
that time." 
(R. 450 at 67.) 
In response to the question whether he had "ever gone into 
Steelco's shop and look[ed] at remnant material that you wanted to 
purchase there," Hurst responded that he had. (R. 450 at 67.) 
From this one example, plaintiffs make it appear that Mr. Hurst 
"picked out" everything he purchased. They completely ignore his 
explanation that his review of the material was basically with 
respect to the South Yard cleanup. They also overlook his further 
testimony that (with one exception) he was never requested to bid 
on material inside the plant and that although he was at the plant 
ten or fifteen times, he always looked at the material outside the 
plant. (R. 454 at 98.) (The one exception was when Heaton 
indicated that there was material inside that he had sheared to the 
wrong dimensions and he wanted a bid on it. Mr. Hurst did make a 
bid, but he did not get the material because his bid was not good 
enough. (R. 454, p. 99.)) It is curious that plaintiffs argue in 
the same breath that these sales were handled in a clandestine 
manner and yet in another breath argue that Mr. Hurst was almost 
constantly at the plant "picking out" what he wanted. 
At this point it is helpful to discuss plaintiffs1 argument 
that everything except the material from the South Yard was 
"remnant" and not "scrap." In direct examination, plaintiffs1 
counsel repeatedly used the word "remnant," probably on the theory 
that if something is repeated often enough people will believe it. 
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But Mr. Hurst specifically explained that, to him, "scraps, 
remnant, drops, shearings, leftovers" are all the same. (R. 450 at 
40.) He further testified (R. 454 at 75-76) that over this period 
of time the material he bought from Heaton would all fit in the 
back of a pickup truck or in the back of Heaton1s trailer and was 
all under ten feet in length and less than five or six inches in 
width. That is well within Steelcofs definition of scrap, not 
remnant. He further testified that except for the semi-truckloads 
of stuff that came in on the big cleanup of the South Yard, all of 
the material was scrap, both to him and according to the definition 
of scrap given by Steelco^ own witness. (See pp. 5-7 and 64-65 of 
opening brief for record references.) Admittedly, there is 
testimony from Heaton that everything sold was "remnant," but 
plaintiffs would have it appear that Heaton1s testimony is without 
contradiction. 
Next, plaintiffs argue (p. 58) that Wasatch paid both Heaton 
and Steelco for the same kind of steel in amounts directed by 
Heaton. There is no explanation that this was with respect to the 
massive cleanup of the South Yard, and the implication is that this 
argument applies as well to the scrap cuttings. With respect to 
the South Yard material, it remains that Heaton was, in fact, given 
part of the material for himself to resell (R. 451 at 13) and was 
directed to dispose of the rest for Steelco (R. 451 at 16-17) . 
There were many truckloads involved in this cleanup. It was after 
about every four or five loads that Heaton, who was plaintiffs1 
superintendent directly charged with disposing of this material, 
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directed which loads were to be paid to him and which to Steelco. 
Thus, there is clearly a "rational explanation" for these 
arguments, and there is no question that Wasatch was following the 
direction of the one given specific authority to handle the task of 
selling the material. 
Finally on this point, plaintiffs argue in the same breath the 
issue of Heaton's authority and the payment of commissions. The 
authority issue as to split payments on the South Yard sales is 
disposed of above. The general question of authority and the 
commissions issue are responded to below. 
Each of the assertions made by plaintiffs at this point in 
their brief has here been carefully examined and has been shown to 
be in error. We do not have the luxury of space to examine every 
error throughout the brief, but it is suggested that these errors 




In section 2 of their brief plaintiffs concede that any 
evidence of a "conspiracy" is purely circumstantial, apart from the 
payment of commissions (which is discussed below), and there 
follows an argument that a conspiratorial agreement "that Wasatch 
would accept stolen steel" is to be inferred from a series of 
supposed circumstances. The problem is that these suppositions are 
not based on record evidence and are certainly not clear and 
convincing evidence. The first argument is that the inference of 
agreeing to accept stolen steel arises from "having done so for 
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years." This is like a dog chasing its tail; but more basically, 
it necessarily presupposes knowledge of the theft (and this 
"knowledge" is also raised as the basis for the "inference"). But 
the lack of evidence for this argument is shown above. Next, the 
inference is said to arise from "obvious efforts to keep the 
arrangement secret." There is no explanation of what the 
supposedly obvious efforts at secrecy were. The facts are contrary 
to this argument. This argument is contrary to plaintiffs' 
previous assertion that Mr. Hurst was over at Steelco handpicking 
what he wanted, and it is inconsistent with Heaton's deliveries in 
broad daylight, before 5:00 p.m., while Steelco's second shift was 
in progress, and Heaton's using of Steelco employees and cranes to 
load the material (record reference at p. 14 of opening brief). 
Where is there any evidence that Mr. Hurst, rather than Heaton, did 
even one thing to conceal anything? It is argued that this 
"inference" arises by "Hurst's lying to Elkington about 
unavailability of part of his records." There is no evidence 
whatever of such a "lie," but on the contrary, Elkington was given 
all the records he asked for. He had asked for and obtained 
Heaton's prior written consent to examine the 1986 and 1987 records 
pertaining to the purchases of steel by Wasatch. He then asked for 
1985 purchase records, and after obtaining Heaton's approval on the 
telephone, those were provided. He asked about earlier years and 
was told that those records would be more difficult to locate. 
Late in the day on New Year's Eve it was not convenient. He was 
never told they did not exist or would not be produced. Elkington 
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simply did not come back at a more convenient time to examine them. 
There was no lying, and it is irresponsible to make this 
accusation. (See. pp. 21-24 of opening brief for record 
references.) Finally, the "inference" is supposed to arise from an 
agreement to confirm a "phony" amount of purchases. There is no 
evidence whatever of any such agreement (no record reference is 
given). All that could be said is that Heaton told Elkington to 
call to verify the amount. (See fn. 2, p. 7, above.) 
These inferences certainly do not meet plaintiffs1 "burden of 
presenting clear and convincing evidence supporting his conspiracy 
theory." Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
Practically the entire case rests upon the wobbly base of 
these so-called inferences. The only direct evidence available to 
plaintiffs boils down to two points: One is Heatonfs disputed 
testimony about not telling Steelco about the purchases, and the 
other is the acknowledged payment of commissions to Heaton involved 
in the second discrete set of facts (the limited number of sales of 
ballast steel to Steelco). Heaton's revelations about his "not 
telling" comments to Mr. Hurst were made only after his improper 
conduct came to light and only in the course of trial. Even 
Heaton's and Williams' statements concerning commissions are made 
only after termination of the supposed conspiracy. They are not 
statements of an alleged co-conspirator made in the course of the 
alleged conspiracy. As discussed in the opening brief (p. 51) , 
acts or declarations of an alleged co-conspirator which are offered 
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to prove existence of a conspiracy are inherently suspect. Only 
declarations made during the course of the conspiracy can be used 
to establish existence of conspiracy. Statements made after 
termination of the conspiracy or made only in the course of trial 
are not accepted as evidence of the existence of the conspiracy. 
The testimony should not be considered, therefore, on the question 
of conspiracy. Wasatch has candidly admitted, however, the payment 
of commissions to Heaton on the separate discrete transaction of 
the sale of ballast steel, and it is appropriate to here further 
consider this matter. 
The commissions. 
Plaintiffs again claim that defendants1 statement of facts is 
"distorted and misrepresented." These harsh words sting. All that 
can be said is that every effort was made to present an accurate 
statement of facts, and only review of the record references will 
tell. The point remains, however, that commissions were paid to 
Heaton, pursuant to Heatonfs request, for arranging purchases of 
ballast steel. Wasatchfs records clearly show four commissions 
paid to Heaton totalling $2,363.44, which calculates to 25% on each 
sale. As shown in the opening brief, plaintiffs claim additional 
commissions of $1,728.75 even though the records do not specify 
what these payments were for. The bottom line remains that an 
admittedly unwise payment of $2,300 (or $4,000, to use plaintiffs1 
calculation) in commissions does not make a $250,000 judgment. 
Plaintiffs raise two points with respect to the payments to 
Heaton (p. 63). The first disagreement is over the statement in 
29 
the opening brief that three of the four commissions were only 
shown in the check register and were not seen by Elkington in his 
New Year's Eve visit because he had not asked to see the check 
register. Plaintiffs try to paint some mala fides in this 
description, but it is accurate. Elkington asked to see the 
records pertaining to sales of steel to Wasatch, and those records 
were given to him and examined by him. Elkington sought nothing 
more in his hurried visit and made no further effort. Remember, he 
is an experienced accountant. If he wanted the check register, it 
was a simple thing to ask for it. Having nothing further to argue 
about, plaintiffs complain about the "roughness" of the material. 
Hurst did not "peddle" anything. Heaton, with authority of his 
supervisor# sought to locate additional material to use as ballast. 
(R. 451 at 22.) Admittedly, the material he located through 
Wasatch was rough, but so was "cobble" steel that had regularly 
been used by Steelco. (R. 451 at 121.) This steel was delivered 
on at least four occasions to Steelco. Steelco knew the quality, 
and it could have rejected delivery or payment at any time it 
chose• 
As to Chris Williams, even with the labored effort in 
plaintiffs1 brief, the evidence is still not clear and convincing 
that even one cent was ever paid to her. All of plaintiffs1 
efforts to shore up this obviously fabricated testimony (or, to be 
charitable, testimony imagined by a long use of "mind altering" 
drugs) does not bring this testimony to the requisite status of 
clear and convincing evidence. There is not one shred of 
30 
corroborative evidence. In an effort to avoid the obvious impact 
of this witness knowingly destroying two days before trial the only 
document that could corroborate her testimony, Steelco again 
snidely refers to the "selective reappearance" of Wasatch1s cash 
records. This claim that Mr. Hurst lied in his deposition 
concerning the theft of cash records is improperly asserted at 
other places in the brief. A great to-do arose at trial over the 
introduction of an exhibit summarizing cash deposits from the bank 
statements and cash deposit slips contained with the bank 
statement. In the deposition, plaintiffs' counsel asked, "What 
records does Wasatch Steel have that show cash receipts and 
disbursements during 1986"? Mr. Hurst explained that "the entire 
set of books were stolen" early in 1988. This entire diatribe is 
shown at R. 454 at 121 through 129 and clearly shows in his 
deposition that the witness was referring to the journals of cash 
transactions maintained by the bookkeeper, all of which were taken 
when her briefcase was stolen from her car. The exhibit prepared 
by Mr. Hurst and presented at trial was taken from the bank 
statements and bank deposit slips (Ex. 53-D). Plaintiffs1 counsel 
made great protestation of surprise and unfairness, but it is 
submitted that had he really wanted bank statements in pretrial 
discovery, or had that been what he was really intending to ask 
about in the deposition, he could have asked specifically for that 
or, better still, could have subpoenaed them from the bank. That 
is obviously not what he was seeking in the deposition; that was 
not what Mr. Hurst was responding to. Mr. Hurst did not lie, and 
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counselfs inflammatory statements at trial and now again in this 
brief are out of place.5 Plaintiffs even infer in their brief that 
the explanation of the theft of the books and journals was 
fabricated or contrived. If counsel had been so concerned, he 
could have deposed or called as a witness the bookkeeper who had 
the briefcase stolen from her car. The point of all of this is 
that this is but a side show inaccurately characterizing the record 
and having no substantive relevance to this case. It is offered 
here primarily for prejudice, as it was at trial. 
Steelco concedes that there are disparities in Williams1 
calculation of these supposed commissions but dismisses these as 
"minute and irrelevant mathematical disparities" due to Williams1 
uncertainty about the transaction on which she was paid a 
commission, the precise amounts involved in any transaction, the 
period of time during which she received the commission, or the 
number of commissions. (Plaintiffs1 brief at 18-19.) It is Chris 
Williams, however, who destroyed two days before trial her only 
purported record of these alleged payments, and it remains that her 
claim of commission payments is so farfetched that it is incredible 
and certainly not clear and convincing. 
5
 This very conduct incited further hostility of the trial 
court that was entirely misplaced and inappropriate (see, e.g., R. 
454 at 121-122) and caused the court improperly to discredit all of 
this witness's testimony (R. 454 at 127-128). 
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C. The Finding of Conversion 
Is in Error 
While the findings of fraud and conspiracy must be established 
by clear and convincing evidence, plaintiffs' burden is less with 
respect to its claim for conversion, but that burden has not been 
met. 
Steelco misconstrues Wasatch's position as an argument "that 
a good faith purchaser should not be liable for conversion." 
Wasatch does not dispute that, as a general rule, "a bona fide 
purchaser of goods for value from one who has no right to sell them 
becomes a converter when he takes possession of such goods." 
Allred v. Hinklev, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958) (emphasis 
added). 
The general rule has limited application to this case for two 
reasons: First, Heaton had actual or apparent authority to sell 
the steel; second, Heaton obtained title to some of the steel by 
purchase or gift. 
The superintendent 
had authority. 
We pause here to respond to plaintiffs' reply to defendants' 
explanation of their just reliance on Heaton's authority to dispose 
of material be they cuttings or South Yard stuff. (Pp. 52-55 of 
opening brief.) The matter of Heaton's authority has relevance to 
both the fraud and conversion claims. We have here a situation 
where an outside party reasonably believed that it was dealing with 
one permitted to make the transactions involved. Plaintiffs' 
argument as to the significance of Heaton's authority is again 
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circuitous—since the court found that Heaton was selling stolen 
stuff, defendants could not have relied on his authority. This 
argument falls of its own weight. Plaintiffs argue that Wasatch 
could not rely on authority of a man to whom they were "regularly 
paying bribes." Plaintiffs here again exaggerate and claim too 
much for the point. They are entitled to argue that the payments 
were "bribes/1 but the harshness of the language does not help 
their cause. It was Heaton who requested a "commission" for 
arranging these sales (R. 451 at 22) , and plaintiffs have candidly 
admitted the payments. The hyperbolic assertion of "regular" 
payments conceals the fact that the commissions were paid on only 
four occasions in late 1986 and 1987. They had no relevance 
whatever to the sales of cuttings from 1983 on or the sales of the 
South Yard material in 1986. 
Steelco tries to get around the consequence of the authority 
generally held by and specifically given to its superintendent by 
arguing that Steelco, as the principal, really did not do anything 
to lead third parties to rely upon their superintendent. But, like 
other of these arguments, it is without foundation. The argument 
is simply that if the court so found, it must be so, without regard 
to the absence of adequate evidence. It is undisputed that, as to 
the South Yard material, Heatonfs boss, Mr. Hansen, did give 
specific authority to dispose of the material. (R. 451 at 13-17.) 
The opening brief (pp. 52-55) correctly explains the authority of 
the superintendent to dispose of not only the South Yard material 
but the cuttings as well. Further, there is nothing in the record 
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to counter Mr. Hurst's explanation of the customary disposition of 
scrap cuttings in the industry. (R. 454 at 162-168.) 
As to the authority of Heaton in regard to the conversion 
claim, the "actual or apparent authority" of Heaton suggests far 
more than good faith on the part of Wasatch. Because an agent of 
Steelco's, acting within the scope of his actual or apparent 
authority, sold the steel to Wasatch, Steelco did not have title to 
the steel and cannot prevail on a conversion claim. 
Heaton had express authority to sell some of the steel in 
Steelco's yard, to buy some for his own use, and to sell some to 
other employees. (R. 450 at 126-128, 132-135, 162-164, 191-192, 
196-197; R. 452 at 194.) He had, in fact, made sales to others 
both before and after this, and sales were regularly made from the 
shop. (R. 450 at 196; 451 at 85, 86.) Heaton was the individual 
"directly in charge" of the scrap pile; he had the specific duty to 
use or dispose of leftover steel. (R. 450 at 121-122, 164.) 
"Whenever the performance of certain business is confided to an 
agent, such authority carries with it, by implication, authority to 
do collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of 
the main act or business authorized." Bowen v. Olsen. 576 P.2d 
862, 864 (Utah 1978). Heaton made sales to at least three other 
companies of steel which Steelco claims to have been stolen. (R. 
451 at 32-37; R. 452 at 147, 207; R. 453 at 4-5.) It is 
significant that plaintiffs produced no evidence that any of these 
companies questioned his authority to sell it. For all 
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appearances, these sales were the natural and ordinary incidents of 
Heaton's duties as superintendent. 
Heaton was not just a "thief"; 
he obtained title to some of 
the steel he sold to Wasatch. 
The second exception to the general rule that a bona fide 
purchaser can nevertheless be liable for conversion relates to the 
fundamental principle that a plaintiff must have title to the goods 
for a "conversion" to occur. See, Benton v. Div. of State Lands & 
Forestry, 709 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1985). A conversion action 
cannot be maintained if the plaintiff is not entitled to immediate 
possession of the property. Larsen v. Knight, 233 P.2d 365, 374 
(Utah 1951). 
This exception occurs "where there is a bona fide purchase of 
goods which the true owner was originally induced to sell by 
fraud." W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 85 (4th Ed. 
1971) . In such case, title has passed on the sale, and the 
original owner can only rescind the transaction to recover the 
goods. Then a bona fide purchaser who had no notice of the fraud 
is not liable to the original owner for conversion. A bona fide 
purchaser cuts off the original owner's equitable rights to the 
property. 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a purchaser of goods 
acquires all the title which his transferor had, except that a good 
faith purchaser for value has power to transfer good title even 
though "the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as 
larcenous under the criminal law." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-
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403(1)(d) (1990 Replacement). A thief cannot pass good title, but 
a person who obtains property bv fraud can transfer good title to 
a bona fide purchaser. Merrill v. Dietz fin re Universal Clearing 
House Co.). 62 B.R. 118, 124 (D. Utah 1986). 
Heaton obtained the steel he sold to Wasatch in four different 
ways: (1) some of it was given to him by Steelco6; (2) some of it 
he paid for7; (3) some of it he took without Steelco1s knowledge; 
and (4) some of it he was authorized to sell for Steelco.8 Heaton 
had good title to the steel he obtained by gift. He also had 
defeasible title to the steel he paid for. Steelco argues that 
Heaton paid less for some loads than they were worth, but it has 
not kept accurate records of its sales to him. In estimating 
damages, the trial court allowed a credit for some of the existing 
receipts from Heaton's purchases. But if, as Steelco alleged, the 
steel had a value above what Heaton paid for it, Wasatch should 
have received a credit for that full value. Even if he paid too 
little, Heaton obtained title to the steel, and Wasatch cannot be 
held for converting those loads for which Heaton paid something. 
The evidence showed that Heaton purchased steel with authori-
zation of Mr. Milzarek and Mr. Hansen. Heaton made cash payments 
to Mr. Milzarek or Patty Midgley for which Steelco kept no record. 
At times Heaton was not even given a receipt for his money. (For 
6
 R. 450 at 13, 165. 
7
 R. 451 at 72-73, 78-79, 86, 90, 94; Ex. 16-P; R. 450 at 178-
184; R: 450 at 197; R. 451 at 96-100, 178-184. 
8
 R. 452 at 194; 451 at 16-18. 
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record references, see pp. 10-11 of opening brief.) Steelco1s 
failure to keep accurate records of its sales to Heaton should not 
create a presumption of nonpayment for which Wasatch is held 
liable. 
Steelcofs argument that "Heaton created phony paperwork which 
was aimed at leading other Steelco employees to believe that he was 
purchasing the steel11 is at best but an argument that Heaton 
defrauded his employer. It does not make Wasatch a converter of 
material that Steelco1s superintendent obtained by fraud. 
Ill 
The Error In the Damage Award 
Plaintiffs make only two responses to the explanation in the 
opening brief that the court applied an erroneous measure of 
damages and miscalculated the amount even under that measure. 
These responses are continued reliance on retail value as the 
measure and a pejorative attack on defendants1 explanation of the 
errors in calculation. 
The value of goods to 
a wholesaler is not 
retail market value. 
As to the measure of damages, Steelco relies primarily on 
Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726 (Utah 1958), and Simmons. Inc. v. 
Pinkerton's Inc.. 762 P.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985) , for the proposition 
that damages should be based on sales price rather than the cost of 
replacement. Simmons was not a conversion action and required 
application of Indiana law. 
38 
In Allred, the court held that a defendant who converted seed 
to its own use was entitled to the full value of such seed less the 
amount which the grower received from it as advancements. 328 P.2d 
at 728. The court did not attempt to define the term "full value." 
Apparently, the term refers to full "fair market value." However, 
the meaning of fair market value varies with the context in which 
the standard is applied. 
"The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the 
injured party to the position he would have been in had it not been 
for the wrong of the other party." Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 241 
P.2d 914, 920 (Utah 1952). Steelco admits that it sold any remnant 
"for the same price it would have charged for new steel." (Record 
reference at p. 8 of opening brief.) In fact, since the entire 
piece of new steel had already been sold to a customer before it 
was cut, Steelco received double pay for any of these cuttings that 
it sold again. Even so, Steelco usually considered these small 
sales not worth the effort and "discouraged" them. (R. 451 at 119-
120.) Steelco "didn't desire that kind of business because it took 
time and effort and usually the sales were small." (R. 451 at 119-
120.) Because Steelco did not wish to handle small customers, it 
often directed customers to Wasatch. (R. 450 at 151.) Further, 
plaintiffs presented no evidence whatever to show which part of the 
supposed converted steel was remnant and which was scrap. 
Clearly, in these circumstances, Steelco1s "injury" for the 
steel Heaton took should not be valued at the retail market value 
of new steel. This is especially so when it is remembered that 
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Steelco replaces these cuttings daily from the "tons and tons" 
produced from its processing in its own plant and that the stock 
from which the processing is done is purchased by it directly from 
the manufacturer. 
Notwithstanding plaintiffs' acerbic attack on defendants1 
integrity in citation of the record (p. 74), it is submitted that 
the shoe is on the other foot. Record references have been 
included where appropriate. (See pp. 64-66 and throughout the 
statement of facts in opening brief.) It is plaintiffs who have 
failed to cite the record and continue with their hyperbolic 
argument. For example, it is not uncontested (as plaintiffs argue 
at p. 74) that Heaton sold only remnant material from Steelco. 
There are two pages of citations in the opening brief (pp. 65 and 
65) showing that this is contested. There is no record citation 
for Steelco1s assertion that "Wasatch Steel purchased only remnant# 
not scrap, from Heaton." (Plaintiffs1 brief at 74.) There is 
likewise no support for the assertion that "The remnant steel that 
was stolen was in the main taken from remnant racks, where it was 
placed to be reused, as new steel, in Steelcofs fabrication 
operation. The remnant material was worth as much to Steelco as 
new steel—the pieces were just smaller." See discussion at pages 
63-65 of opening brief. 
The position stated in the opening brief is correct. The 
trial court's application of damage concepts and calculation of 
damages is clearly erroneous. 
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There was no basis for an 
award of attorney fees. 
Steelco apparently concedes that the only legal basis for the 
trial courtfs award of attorney fees would be to consider those 
fees as part of the punitive damage award. (Plaintiffs1 brief at 
75.) The only precedent cited for a "punitive" attorney fee award 
is DeBry & Hilton Travel Services. Inc. v. Capitol Internat'l 
Airways. Inc., 583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978). Attorney fees were 
denied in DeBry. This Court affirmed this denial, explaining: 
This court has consistently adhered to the general rule 
that attorney fs fees are not recoverable as damages in 
either actions on contract or in torts, if there is no 
statutory or contractual authority for such fees. 
At 1185. The Court then noted in dictum that counsel fees could be 
considered as an element of damages only in those cases in which 
exemplary damages are or can be awarded. The basic damage in this 
case is clearly erroneous and excessive, and the punitive damages 
are in an amount that will do more than punish—they will destroy. 
It is not appropriate that attorney fees be added. 
The punitive damage award 
was improper and excessive. 
If the attorney fees awarded in this case could be considered 
a further award of punitive damages, the excessive amount of those 
damages is even more obvious. 
Actual damages were awarded in the principal amounts of 
$104,438.00 and $15,979.15 plus interest; punitive damages were 
awarded in the amount of $100,000.00 plus interest. (R. 379-380.) 
Attorney fees, which Steelco justifies as part of the punitive 
damages award, were awarded in the amount of $35,850.00. (R. 380.) 
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Thus, the ratio of actual to punitive damages, considering only the 
amounts of principal, was $120,417.15 to $135,850.00. 
Punitive damages are the exception rather than the rule and 
should be imposed cautiously. "Punitive damages should be awarded 
infrequently" and "they are not intended to vent vindictiveness." 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc.. 675 P.2d 1179, 1186-1187 
(Utah 1983) . They are "not intended as additional compensation to 
a plaintiff, [and] must, if awarded, serve a societal interest of 
punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious conduct which is 
not likely to be deterred by other means." Atkin Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Tel.. 709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 1985). 
This award was not imposed cautiously. It is an astronomical 
award that could well be the death knell for Wasatch, a much 
smaller business than the plaintiff Steelco. As shown by its 
financial statement, Wasatch simply cannot afford to pay such sums 
and remain in business. 
A vindictive desire to destroy Wasatch Steel is manifested by 
plaintiffs1 brief and particularly its discussion on damages. This 
attitude has been manifest throughout this dispute. 
For example, Elkington insisted on crediting Heaton1s payments 
under the settlement agreement first to the transactions with All 
Star, one of the other companies that purchased steel cuttings from 
Heaton. (R. 453 at 9.) Steelco has never asserted a claim against 
All Star and has no intention to do so. (R. 454 at 10.) It is 
believed that Steelco has likewise brought no action against any of 
the other companies that purchased steel from Heaton. Heaton and 
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Williams—whose potential criminal liability is clear and whose 
testimony is obviously self-serving—were not prosecuted. 
Not only did Steelco receive money from Heaton in settlement 
of its claims, but it might have recovered from its fidelity 
insurance. (R. 454 at 5.) However, Elkington chose to file "only 
a claim on the cash thefts by Chris Williams." (Id.) He did not 
even file a claim as to Volma Heaton's thefts or the alleged 
"kickbacks." (Id. at 6.) He explained: 
Those were claims that were going to take a lot of work 
to assemble and to prove. And I thought that that could 
best be handled either through negotiations directly with 
Wasatch Steel or a filing of a civil suit. 
(Id.) 
Steelco1s motivation for singling out Wasatch is shown by 
Elkington's testimony at trial: 
Q. So by putting it over here and the filing of 
this lawsuit and pursuing it the way you have, 
you intend to punish Lynn Hurst, is that 
correct, because you think he lied to you? 
A. [Elkington] I guess I wouldn't characterize it 
as punishment. I believe I am entitled to 
allocate the proceeds any way I wish. 
Q. I am asking you another question now. It goes 
beyond allocation. You want to punish Lynn 
Hurst in this lawsuit; is that correct? 
A. Sure. 
Q. And you want to punish Wasatch Steel, is that 
also correct? 
A. I want to recognize—I want them to be 
recognized for the type of dealings they 
conducted with the employees in my company. 
(R. 453 at 10-11.) 
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This case should not be utilized as a vehicle to satisfy the 
vindictive desire of plaintiffs' president. 
REPLY TO CROSS-APPEAL 
I 
Defendants Did Not Violate 
The Racketeering Act 
The trial court correctly dismissed the claim under Utah's 
racketeering act, now known as the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
Act."9 (See R. 364, 5 15.) The findings on this claim were first 
made in the court's Memorandum Decision: 
The acts of the parties herein do not bring them within 
the [state] racketeering act. The necessary requirements 
are not met. The Court finds that for the racketeering 
act to apply, there must be three similar episodes that 
involve separate and different entities, and not within 
the same entity. The purpose of the racketeering act is 
to prohibit racketeering. That is, to prohibit illegal 
businesses being set up to defraud other businesses or 
people as a racket. The fact that there were similar 
episodes involving Heaton and Wasatch Steel do not 
satisfy the requirements. 
(R. 279, fl 25; emphasis added.) The court instructed plaintiffs to 
prepare additional findings of fact and conclusions of law "that 
are supportive of this Memorandum Decision." (R. 280, J 27.) 
The findings prepared by plaintiffs contain this terse 
paragraph regarding the racketeering claim: 
Plaintiffs did not prove the existence of three similar 
episodes of unlawful activity that involve separate and 
different entities, as required by the Racketeering Act. 
9
 Prior to its amendment in 1987, Utah's racketeering statute 
was known as the "Racketeer Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act" 
(RICE). See, State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 101 (Utah 1988). The 
statute was also amended in 1985, 1988, and 1990. 
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Plaintiffs demonstrated only that Wasatch Steel Inc. and 
Hurst engaged in episodes of unlawful activity involving 
Steelco, but not any other persons or entities. 
(R. 359, Finding 62.) 
Plaintiffs now argue that "the trial court held that the Act 
requires proof of episodes of unlawful activity involving three 
separate victims." (Plaintiffs' brief at 80.) In making this 
argument, plaintiffs mischaracterize the holding. Nowhere did the 
court say three separate victims was a requirement. Rather, the 
Memorandum Decision states more broadly that plaintiffs failed to 
show the necessary elements for such a claim. 
The elements of a "pattern of unlawful activity" and an 
"enterprise" are common to each of the four subsections of § 76-10-
1603 which plaintiffs allege were violated. Section 76-10-1603 is 
contained in Appendix B to this brief. See. State v. McGrath. 749 
P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1988) ("pattern of racketeering [unlawful] 
activity" and "enterprise" are necessary elements for conviction 
under RICE statute). Plaintiffs failed to make an adequate showing 
as to either of these elements. 
Plaintiffs failed to 
show a predicate offense. 
The Act defines "unlawful activity" as "conduct which would 
constitute any offense described by the following crimes or 
categories of crimes. . . . regardless of whether the act is in 
fact charged or indicted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(4). The 
statute then enumerates the possible predicate offenses. 
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged three predicate 
offenses: theft, receiving stolen property, and bribery. However, 
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they failed to show any of these offenses.10 A conversion can be 
committed in good faith and is not the equivalent of a theft. The 
court dismissed the claim for receiving stolen property. Nor was 
bribery shown.11 
Since plaintiffs failed to show that one of the enumerated 
acts of "unlawful activity" had been committed, a fortiori, they 
failed to show a "pattern of unlawful activity." 
Plaintiffs failed to show a 
"pattern of unlawful activity". 
A "pattern of unlawful activity" is defined as: 
[E]ngaging in conduct which constitutes the commission of 
at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which 
episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar 
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of 
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by 
distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the 
episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct 
and be related either to each other or to the enterprise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602 (1991 Supp.). 
Although this definition differs from the definition of a 
"pattern of racketeering activity" under the federal statute, 
ia
 "Conspiracy" was an enumerated act under a former 
racketeering statute, but it was never "a separate basis for 
recovery." See. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields v. Tracy Collins Bank. 
558 F.Supp. 1042, 1048 (Utah 1983). It is no longer listed as a 
predicate offense in recent amendments of the act. 
11
 The Act specifically defines the "unlawful activity" that 
may serve as a predicate offense. (Section 76-10-1602(4)). 
Specific types of bribery are enumerated in the statute, such as 
"bribery of a labor official" and "bribery by a public servant." 
None of these apply. Plaintiffs refer simply to "bribery" in 
general by reference to Section 76-6-508, but the Act lists as an 
"unlawful activity" only "bribery or receiving bribe by person in 
the business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of goods." 
Section 76-10-1602(4)(s) (1990 & Supp. 1991). Even if the 
commissions paid to Heaton could be considered bribes, Heaton was 
not in the business of selecting, appraising or criticizing goods. 
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federal cases which elaborate on that definition are helpful in our 
analysis. 
A "pattern of racketeering activity" contemplates "multiple 
transactions or episodes, not just multiple acts to promote the 
same transaction or episode." Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F.Supp. 570 
578 (D. Utah 1986). It requires "planned, ongoing continuing crime 
and the threat of continuing criminal conduct, as opposed to 
sporadic, isolated criminal episodes or events." Cook v. Zions 
First Nat'l Bank, 645 F.Supp. 423, 425-26 (D. Utah 1986). Where "a 
single fraudulent scheme is relied upon, albeit multiple acts 
allegedly were committed by defendant," the plaintiff has failed to 
present the requisite pattern. Cady v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 
648 F.Supp. 621, 626 (D. Utah 1986). 
At most, plaintiffs1 claims assert multiple acts to promote 
the same transaction or episode. There was only one actual or 
potential victim and no evidence of a broader set of criminal 
objectives. In short, there was no pattern of racketeering 
activity. 
Plaintiffs failed 
to show a distinct 
racketeering "enterprise". 
11
 [P] roof of the existence of an enterprise and its 
relationship to the racketeering activity is essential for a 
conviction" under Utah's racketeering statute. State v. Bell. 770 
P.2d 100, 103 n.2 (Utah 1988). An enterprise may consist of "an 
individual, corporation, or other business entity, or any de facto 
association, and may be either a legal or an illicit entity." Id. 
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However, the federal and state statutes are similar in requiring 
that the "enterprise" be an "entity separate and apart from the 
pattern of activity in which it engages." McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 at 
637. 
In McGrath, the court found that the defendant and another man 
had an "ongoing association in fact" for the purpose of making 
money from the sale of controlled substances. Id. "The two men 
functioned as a 'continuing unit for a common purpose of engaging 
in a course of conduct.• Id. By contrast, defendants and Heaton 
never functioned as a "continuing unit." When Heaton obtained 
steel from his employer, it was he alone who determined whether to 
pay his employer for it and how to dispose of it. At times he 
resold it to Wasatch; at other times he resold it to All Star, Mr. 
Trailer, or others—without any involvement on the part of these 
defendants. 
The "enterprise" must also be distinct from the "persons" who 
are defendants in the action. E.g., Grant v. Union Bank. 629 
F.Supp. 570, 574-75 (D. Utah 1986); Bennett v. United States Trust 
Co. of New York, 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 
106 S.Ct. 800 (1986) and cases cited therein. 
Thus, the trial court correctly found that "for the 
racketeering act to apply, there must be three similar episodes 
that involve separate and different entities, and not within the 
same entity." (R. 279, 5 25.) 
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II 
The Pawn Broker Act 
Is Not Applicable 
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs1 claim that defendants 
received stolen property in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408. 
The court correctly held that this section did not apply because 
"the parties involved are not pawnbrokers or persons dealing in or 
collecting used or secondhand merchandise. . . . While Wasatch 
Steel may sell steel that has been used, the above section does not 
contemplate such businesses or activities as involved in this 
case." (Memorandum Decision, R. 280, 5 26; see R. 359, Finding 63.) 
A civil action is permitted by Section 76-6-412(2) only 
against persons mentioned in Section 76-6-408(2)(d). Section 
408(2)(d) imposes special requirements on pawnbrokers or persons 
who are similarly situated. For example, a pawnbroker must require 
the seller or person delivering the property to certify, in 
writing, that he has the legal right to sell the property. 
Subsection (2) (d) . The mere fact that Wasatch sells some used 
steel, as well as new, should not subject it to these special 
requirements. To hold otherwise would create potential liability 
for many of the businesses in this state just because some of the 
items they sell may have been used before. 
No case has been found in which this statute was extended to 
a party who was not, in effect, a pawnbroker. 
The civil action permitted by Section 412(2) requires a 
finding that the defendant knew that the goods were stolen. That 
Finding 13 is clearly erroneous is shown above. The presumptions 
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that plaintiffs rely upon cannot be applied, because the findings 
which are the necessary predicate for those presumptions to apply 
are for the same reason clearly erroneous, and, moreover, the 
findings were not made in sufficient detail to sustain the 
presumption required by this Act. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The trial court misconstrued and misapplied important legal 
principles. The statute of limitations barred substantially all of 
plaintiffs1 claims; prior release of Heaton precluded assertion of 
any claims. The factual findings are clearly erroneous. The 
damages are based on an improper measure of damages and are 
incorrectly calculated even under that measure. Attorney fees are 
not authorized. The absence of clear and convincing evidence of 
fraud precludes the award of punitive damages, and those damages, 
in any event# are excessive. 
Neither statute upon which plaintiffs assert liability in 
their cross-appeal is applicable here, and dismissal of those 
claims should be affirmed. 
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APPENDIX A 
Testimony of Volma Heaton that He Told Defendants 
He Was Buying and Reselling the Steel and that 
The Subject Never Came Up Again 
(R. 451 at 78-81) 
Q. You told them where you worked? 
A. Yes. 
* * * 
A* Yes, Lynn knew where I worked. 
Q. All right. Did you tell him that this was 
Steelco's material? 
A. When I first started dealing with him, I told 
him that I was buying it and reselling it. 
Q. And that is the only conversation you had along 
that line, is it? 
A. That is right. 
* * * 
[Q.] And that is the only conversation you ever had 
along that line, isn't it? 
A. That is right. 
* * * 
A. In fact, it was never brought up after that with 
the exception of I would say a few months after I 
started dealing with Lynn, one of his employees was 
there when I brought it in. He was an employee. 
Whether or jokingly or serious, he said, fI don't 
know. It looks like high rate stuff to me. • And 
Lynn said, 'No, it is not.• And I said, 'No, it is 
not. • 
* * * 
Q. When you mentioned the word fhigh grade,• does that 
have a meaning in the steel industry? 
A. Yes. Well, not in the steel industry, anywhere. 
It is hot or stolen. 
Q. High grade means it is stolen? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. And you denied that; is that correct? 
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I didnft answer. Lynn said, 'No, it is not. He 
bought it.f 
And that is what you told him initially? 
That is correct. 
Was that you were buying it? 
That is correct. 
And the subject never came up again? 
No, it did not. 
All right. 
Well, let me — Let me— Let me retrack [sic] 
[retract] that to this extent. That on occasion 
there was, when we finished cleaning out the yard, 
there were some beams and stuff that were sold and 
I told Mr. Hurst that the material was delivered 
over there. I told him part of it was theirs, part 




(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any 
proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a 
pattern of unlawful activity in which the person has 
participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly 
or indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds 
of the income, or the proceeds derived from the 
investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition 
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, 
any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of 
unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly or 
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or 
associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, 
whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful 
activity. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate 
any provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3). 
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